Classical negotiation models are weak in supporting real-world business negotiations because these models often assume that the preference information of each negotiator is made public. Although parametric learning methods have been proposed for acquiring the preference information of negotiation opponents, these methods suffer from the strong assumptions about the specific utility function and negotiation mechanism employed by the opponents. Consequently, it is difficult to apply these learning methods to the heterogeneous negotiation agents participating in e-Marketplaces. This paper illustrates the design, development, and evaluation of a non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery method which is underpinned by the well-known Bayesian learning paradigm. According to our empirical testing, the novel knowledge discovery method can speed up the negotiation processes while maintaining the negotiation effectiveness. To our best knowledge, this is the first non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery method developed and evaluated in the context of multi-issue bargaining over e-Marketplaces.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of the number of business transactions completed over e-marketplaces, it is desirable to improve the level of autonomy, and hence the efficiency of these electronic markets. With reference to the Business-to-Business Transaction (BBT) model [22] , negotiation is one important stage within the business transaction processing cycle. Although various auctioning mechanisms have been examined [52] , automated multi-party multi-issue negotiation mechanism is not a common feature of existing e-Marketplaces. Generally speaking, auction is one simple form of negotiation, that is, single issue (price) negotiation. On the other hand, bargaining is a more complex form of negotiation which involves two or more parties negotiating over multiple issues simultaneously [4, 9, 33] . Automated negotiations have long been a hot research topic and received considerable attentions from a variety of research disciplines such as Economics [37, 50] , Social Psychology [3, 43, 44] , Operational Research [11, 23] , Distributed Artificial Intelligence [13, 55] , and Agent Mediated e-Commerce [9, 21, 22] .
Nevertheless, as the assumptions of classical negotiation models (e.g., availability of the opponents' payoff functions) do not match the characteristics of the real-world dynamic negotiation environment, it is not easy to apply these models to support e-Business negotiations. A knowledge discovery mechanism for automatically learning the opponents' preferences is one of the ways to address the shortcomings of existing negotiation models. Knowledge discovery (or data mining) refers to the non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data [15] . In the context of automated negotiations, the novel patterns are the negotiation preferences (i.e., the frequently proposed negotiation options). This kind of pattern is ultimately understandable and potentially useful because they can be applied to improve both negotiation effectiveness (e.g., joint payoffs) and negotiation efficiency [32] . This paper focuses on the development and evaluation of a novel negotiation knowledge discovery method which can be used to enhance multi-issue negotiation (bargaining) models so that these models can be applied to support business negotiations in e-Marketplaces. The proposed negotiation knowledge discovery method is underpinned by machine learning techniques in general, and the naive Bayesian classifier in particular [35, 42, 53] .
Background
Negotiations are ubiquitous and conducted in various contexts such as the formation of virtual enterprises [22] , managing labor disputes [55] , resolving hostage crisis [60] , streamlining logistic supply chain [58] , refining system requirements [18] , etc.
Negotiation refers to the process by which group of agents (human or software) communicate with one another in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on resource allocation (distribution) [34] . When multi-agent technologies are applied to automated negotiations, software agents are often used to capture human negotiators' preferences and these agents can autonomously bargain with the opponents on behalf of their human users [9, 39] . Software agents are encapsulated computer systems situated in some environments such as the Internet and are capable of flexible, autonomous actions in that environment to meet their design objectives [26, 61] . In typical e-marketplaces [7, 25, 28, 54] , buyer agents and seller agents exchange their demands (or supplies) of some products (or services) with the mediation of the administrator agents which enforce specific negotiation protocols in the electronic markets.
Learning is an important behavior of human negotiators and it can be used to improve negotiation outcomes in general [39, 44, 56, 62] . Since negotiators tend to keep their preferences (e.g., reservation prices) private to protect self-payoffs, a learning mechanism can facilitate a negotiation agent to discover the hidden agenda of its opponent so as to improve the bargaining process (e.g., not accepting the opponent's counter-offer until the opponent's reservation price is reached). In general, it is believed that an agent's ability of acquiring the knowledge about its negotiation opponents is critical for effective negotiations in the context of e-Commerce [9] .
A stylized international business negotiation adopted from Rangaswamy and Shell [45] is used to illustrate a typical multi-issue negotiation scenario and the prominent issues arising in such a context. The negotiation setting involves a Hungarian buyer of a medical company who gives the highest priority to the type of currency for trade settlement due to the shortage of foreign currencies in Hungary. On the other hand, the seller is a U.S. medical equipment supplier who sees delivery date as the most important issue due to the shortage of inventory. Table 1 highlights the ordinal preferences of the Hungarian buyer and the U.S. seller over four negotiation issues and four options pertaining to each of these issues. The most preferred issue or option is ranked (1) . Unlike single issue distributive negotiations (i.e., zero sum game), multi-issue integrative negotiations allow a larger number of alternatives to be explored by the negotiators such that a "win-win" rather than a "win-lose" situation can be attained [20] . For example, "currency" is the most important issue for the Hungarian buyer but the least important issue for the U.S. seller; it is possible to reach a compromise such that the buyer can pay in Hungarian currency, whereas the seller is compensated by having a longer delivery period of 14 months. Finding deals which best satisfy the preference of each party has significant impact on B2B e-Commerce because it helps maintaining persistent business relationships; eventually it may reduce the trading costs (e.g., the costs for searching new partners) for all the parties.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] .
If the preference information as disclosed in Table 1 is available to each negotiator, it is not difficult to identify the best deal satisfying the major preference of each party by using classical game theoretic methods [46, 50, 59] . However, to protect individual business benefits, the Hungarian buyer may not be willing to disclose its preference information (e.g., its upper reservation price of 225 000 $ , ) to the U.S. seller. The same attitude is also applied to the U.S. seller. Under such circumstance, the Hungarian buyer does not know that she can bargain with the U.S. seller to maintain her currency favor while giving up her delivery preference. For a small negotiation space involving only a few issues and options, the negotiators may exercise a "try and error" approach to find an agreement. However, the negotiation space grows exponentially for a typical business negotiation scenario which consists of dozens of issues and options. On one hand, human cognitive load is too limited to effectively explore a large negotiation space, and on the other hand, constrained resources (e.g., limited time) may prevent the negotiators from taking a resources demanding deliberation approach. Consequently, sub-optimal rather than optimal deals are often reached and the phenomenon of "leaving some money on the table" occurs [44] . It has been observed that advanced information technology can alleviate information overload and facilitate human decision making in general [24] . This observation motivates us to explore knowledge discovery method for the development of practical negotiation mechanisms to assist human negotiators.
The Problems of Learning the Opponents' Preferences
Although classical game theoretic negotiation models [50, 59] provide excellent theoretical analysis of the optimal outcomes (e.g., Nash equilibrium) for certain scenarios, these normative theories do not provide specific instructions to guide the negotiators to choose the courses of actions leading to the optimal outcomes. Another concern for the practical use of these normative theories is that the search space of considering all the possible strategies and interactions in order to identify the equilibrium solutions grows exponentially. The third problem of existing negotiation models [13, 14, 49, 50, 59 ] is that they assume the availability of complete information about a negotiation space (e.g., information about the opponents' preferences).
To address the problem of assuming the availability of the opponents' private preference information in automated negotiation systems, some studies have been done to examine the feasibility of automatically learning the opponents' preferences based on the negotiation histories [6, 8, 19, 29, 36, 38, 62] . With the learning capability, a negotiation agent can gradually acquire some knowledge about the opponents' preferences so as to improve subsequent negotiation outcomes. However, most of the learning mechanisms discussed in the literature are based on a parametric learning model where a specific negotiation method (e.g., the TDT method) and utility function (e.g., a linearly additive function) are assumed. As participants in an e-Marketplace have absolute freedom in terms of the negotiation mechanisms and the utility functions they would like to employ, it is difficult to apply a parametric knowledge discovery method to serve the heterogeneous negotiation agents participating in an e-Marketplace. Although probabilistic learning approach has been examined for acquiring the opponents' preferences, existing probabilistic approaches rely on the availability of some priori probability distributions of the opponents' utility values [5, 62] . Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the opponents will disclose such information in a competitive business negotiation environment.
Contributions
The main contributions of our research work are two folds; from the theoretical stand point, we contribute to the design, development, and empirical testing of a novel negotiation knowledge discovery method which is essential to address the shortcomings of existing automated negotiation mechanisms. In particular, the knowledge acquisition problem not effectively resolved by previous Bayesian learning methods [5, 62] and the parametric learning methods [6, 8, 19, 36, 38] is addressed by our current study. The proposed negotiation knowledge discovery mechanism can continuously monitor the negotiation dialogs between an agent and its opponents so that the preferences of the opponents can be induced to improve subsequent negotiation outcomes.
From the practical stand point, our research work opens the door to the development of practical bargaining mechanisms to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of modern e-Marketplaces. In fact, B2C e-Marketplaces such as eBay.com and B2B
e-Marketplaces such as ChemConnect.com or Alibaba.com have become increasingly more popular. However, only single issue (e.g., price) negotiation support (i.e., auctioning) is available in these e-Marketplaces. The proposed negotiation knowledge discovery method and the corresponding probabilistic negotiation decision making model can provide e-Marketplaces with more sophisticated negotiation mechanisms.
As a whole, our research work contributes to advance the e-Commerce practice by developing intelligent software tools to enhance the throughput of e-Marketplaces.
Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A comparison between previous research work with ours is given in Section 2. The system architecture of negotiation agents mediated e-Marketplace is outlined in Section 3. The main elements of an automated negotiation model are described in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the computational details of the novel negotiation knowledge discovery method and the corresponding probabilistic bargaining mechanism. Section 6 describes the quantitative evaluation of our probabilistic bargaining system empowered by the non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery mechanism. Finally, we offer concluding remarks and describe future direction of our research work.
Related Work
A utility learning algorithm is proposed to elicit the utility function of an agent who acts in a sequential decision making problem [6] . An agent's utility function U is assumed linearly additive such as that is, the probability of the opponent accepting a potential offer o . Unlike the approach adopted in [6] , we do not assume that a prior probability distribution such as ( ) p µ is available nor the coefficient i α (i.e., the weight of a negotiation issue) is common knowledge for all the participating agents.
Kernel density estimation has been applied to learn a negotiation opponent's preferences in the context of multi-issue bi-lateral negotiations [8] . 
V o which is also an important element of a utility function [8] . One problem of this approach is that the utility learning method is only applicable to a specific negotiation model (e.g., the fuzzy similarity trade-off model [13] ). In addition, the utility learning method is not easily applied to deal with discrete symbolic issues. Our negotiation knowledge discovery method is more general and it does not assume a particular form of utility function (linear or nonlinear) nor a specific negotiation mechanism to be adopted by an agent. It can be applied to multi-issue negotiations involving both quantitative and qualitative issue domains.
A learning algorithm is proposed for single instance electronic negotiations where a negotiation agent may not meet its opponent in the e-Marketplace before [36] .
Assuming that the opponents employ the Time-Dependent Behavioral Tactic (TDT) [12] , the derivatives of the Taylor's series approximation of the TDT function can be constructed based on several initial offers from the opponent. In particular, five parameters of the TDT formula are derived from the derivatives of the Taylor's series.
In contrast, our negotiation knowledge discovery method tries to estimate the probability of acceptance of an offer based on the probability distributions induced from the negotiation history. There is no explicit assumption about a particular negotiation model employed by the opponents.
Naive Bayesian classification has been applied to develop negotiation agents in the context of multi-agent co-ordination [5] . Negotiation is treated as a refinement process (a hill-climbing search) based on an agreement tree. Each agent employs a refinement bias function (i.e., a utility function) to narrow their search. The refinement function is expressed as: where i c represents the discretized utility value (i.e., a class) and j e is one of the features of an offer o . Nevertheless, one main problem of this approach is the assumption that the opponent will disclose its preference information (e.g., the prior probability ( )
Pr e c | ) so that an agent can construct the training examples.
Unfortunately, this assumption is inappropriate for many real-world applications.
Instead of directly estimating the utility values attached to the opponents' offers, our approach estimates the probability of an offer to be accepted by the opponent (i.e., ( ) Pr accept o | ) based on the negotiation history.
Zeng and Sycara [62] have developed a sequential negotiation model called Bazaar. It is believed that an agent's belief about the opponent's true reservation price could be computed according to the posterior probability
Pr H characterizes the probability distribution of the opponent's reservation prices and is assumed public information in the negotiation system. Moreover, domain knowledge in the form of conditional probabilities
Pr o H | describing the chance of receiving an offering price o given the opponent's true reservation price i H is assumed available. This approach suffers from the problem of assuming the availability of the opponents' private information (e.g., the true reservation price). We propose an efficient negotiation knowledge discovery method for estimating the probability of offer acceptance by the opponent without the assumption of the availability of the opponents' private information. Moreover, our proposed Bayesian learning mechanism is extended to deal with multiple negotiation issues.
Oliver has applied a genetic algorithm (GA) to develop the decision making and the learning mechanisms of adaptive negotiation agents [39, 40, 41] . The particular GA makes use of a binary encoding scheme with each chromosome representing a negotiation threshold. An agent's concession making process is driven by the evolution of the population of chromosomes. Standard genetic operators such as uniform cross-over and mutation are used to evolve the populations. After executing an evolution process (e.g., evolving 20 generations), a chromosome will be selected as the current solution. An incoming offer from the opponent is then evaluated based on the negotiation threshold encoded on the chosen chromosome. Our learning mechanism discussed in this paper is underpinned by Bayesian learning rather than evolutionary algorithm. There is another hybrid preference learning method which combines evolutionary learning with simulated annealing [19] . Moreover, parametric utility learning method has also been extended to handle the cases where inconsistent agent behavior may arise [38] .
System Architecture
The system architecture of our Web services and software agents mediated e-Marketplace is depicted in Figure 1 . Our system architecture is designed with reference to a sound B2B business model, namely the Business-to-Business
Transaction model (BBT) [22] . With reference to Figure 1 , a service buyer (e.g., a computer wholesaler) or its dedicated software agent can search for a directory service (e.g., the UDDI registry [57] ) based on business names, service types, or interface ID numbers via a client program. Once an appropriate e-marketplace (e.g., a computer market) is identified, a connection point (i.e., a URL) and a service contract specified by the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) can be retrieved. If the service interface is of a known type, dynamic proxies can be generated to access the service. The e-Marketplace service could be provided by a trusted third party (e.g., a commercial bank). Similarly, a service seller (e.g., a computer manufacturer) or its dedicated software agent can search for the UDDI business registry to look up suitable e-Marketplace to sell their products or services.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE].
The buyer (seller) agents will join the e-Marketplace to search for suitable products providers (consumers) on behalf of their human users. This process corresponds to the "Partnership Formation" and the "Product Brokering" stages of the BBT model [22] .
The market administrator agents are responsible for providing market information (e.g., products and their descriptions) to each participating trading agent in the e-Marketplace. In addition, the administrator agent is also responsible for enforcing a pre-defined negotiation protocol (e.g., the alternate offering protocol) for the particular e-Marketplace. Once a buyer (seller) identifies suitable sellers (buyers), it can start to negotiate with these trading partners (e.g., making offers). This marks the beginning of the "Negotiation" stage of the BBT model. As shown in Figure 1 , each agent will employ their own negotiation mechanism to negotiate with its opponents, and each agent may not realize the preferences of its opponents. There is not a central decision making mechanism to determine resource/service allocation (distribution) in the e-Marketplace.
Each agent's negotiation strategy is characterized by the negotiation preferences initially specified by their human user (e.g., a business manager). The user will specify the utility function, that is, the valuations of negotiation issues and the valuations of options for each issue. To make the negotiation process more effective and efficient, a negotiation agent can gradually learn the opponents' negotiation preferences based on the previous and the current exchanges of offers captured in the corresponding negotiation history files. Basically, an agent will maintain a history of negotiation dialogs with each of its trading partners. Based on the novel negotiation knowledge discovery mechanism discussed in Section 5, the preferences of the trading partners can be discovered to improve the agent's subsequent negotiation strategies (e.g., to concede faster). As a result, the throughput of the whole e-Marketplace can be improved.
A rich conceptual model for automated negotiations can be extended to include a human behavior module which characterizes the social behavior aspects when human agents participate in negotiation processes. The modeling and development of the human behavior module can be based on the theory of reasoned action (TRA) [16] ; the overall negotiation process (e.g., the trade-off process) can be conceptualized by a process-oriented model [51] . Development of the human behavior model and the conceptual negotiation process can form another line of future research. In fact, preliminary work of employing the notion of beliefs to model negotiation processes has been conducted before [30] .
The Main Elements of a Negotiation Mechanism
An alternate offering negotiation protocol, a variant of the monotonic concession protocol [47] , can be adopted in the e-Marketplaces. Automated negotiation proceeds in a discrete series of rounds and is mediated by the administrator agent. In each round, each negotiation agent makes an offer in alternate order. If these offers overlap, it means that an agreement is reached. If the offers do not overlap, negotiation proceeds to the next round where the agents make a concession. If an agreement is not reached after the deadline is passed, the negotiation process will be terminated with a conflict. The negotiation mechanism illustrated in this section is based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [27] .
A negotiation space Neg = P A D U T < , , , , > is a 5-tuple which consists of a finite set of negotiation parties (agents) P , a set of attributes (i.e., negotiation issues) A understood by every agent p P ∈ , a set of attribute domains D for A , and a set of 
Offer Representation
An offer
> is a n-tuple of attribute values (intervals) pertaining to a finite set of attributes 
Preference Representation
Preference representation is concerned about rating a set of potential offers according to an agent's specific negotiation interests. 
Concession Generation
If an agent's initial proposal is rejected by its opponent, it needs to propose an alternative offer with the least utility decrement (i.e., computing a concession). There are a variety of concession generation methods which underpin different negotiation models [2, 7, 12, 14] . An effective concession generation method for sequential negotiations operates in the following way: An agent maintains a set p O ′ which contains the offers it has proposed before (including the offer proposed in the current round 
Evaluation of the Opponents' Offers
When 
Knowledge Discovery for Multi-issue Negotiations
The well-known data mining method, Apriori association rule mining [1] , can progressively discover frequent item-sets for rule extractions. The measures of rule support (priori joint probability) and rule confidence (priori conditional probability) are used to evaluate the quality of the association rules extracted from frequent item-sets. Our approach of negotiation knowledge discovery is also based on computing the priori probabilities of the frequently requested items (e.g., negotiation
issues and options) appearing in a negotiation history file. Typical Bayesian classification involves a training phase and a testing phase [35] . In the context of automated negotiation, the training phase refers to the extraction and cleaning up of the offer (counter-offer) information captured in a negotiation history file and the computation of the priori probabilities about offer acceptance (e.g., ( ) Pr accept ). The computational details of how our novel knowledge discovery method is applied to the training phase will be illustrated in Section 5.1. During the testing phase, the naive Bayesian classifier estimates the likelihood that an arbitrary offer will be accepted by the negotiation opponent (e.g., ( ) Pr accept o | ) according to the priori probabilities derived from the training phase. The computational details of how to apply the naive Bayesian classifier to negotiation decision making will be covered in Section 5.2.
Mining opponents' preferences based on negotiation history
A generic negotiation knowledge discovery method should be developed such that it can be applied to a variety of negotiation mechanisms which may co-exist in an e-Marketplace. Therefore, the proposed knowledge discovery mechanism does not focus on estimating the specific parameter values of a particular negotiation formula.
Moreover, a practical negotiation knowledge discovery method should be able to discover an opponent's preferences solely based on the public information available to a negotiation agent (e.g., the negotiation history). Negotiation knowledge discovery can be conducted before a negotiation process takes place. In particular, we would like to estimate the probability ( ) Pr accept o | , that is the probability of the opponent accepting an arbitrary offer o proposed by an agent p ; this posteriori probability can be computed based on the priori probabilities derived from a weighted negotiation history file. As naive Bayesian learning is computationally efficient [35] , the proposed probabilistic knowledge discovery mechanism can be applied to extract the preference information of an opponent from the current negotiation session. Thereby, the most current preference of the opponent can be discovered even if its preference may change over time.
Basically, a negotiation agent can keep a separate record for the negotiation dialogs with each opponent. Based on the individual negotiation history file, the preference mining mechanism can compute the priori probabilities such as ( ) Pr accept (i.e., the probability of the opponent accepting an arbitrary offer in general), ( ) Pr reject (i.e., the probability of the opponent rejecting an arbitrary offer in general),
, the probability of a specific negotiation option appearing in an accepted offer of the opponent), and
, the probability of a specific negotiation option appearing in a rejected offer of the opponent).
The basic intuition of our negotiation knowledge discovery method is that each counter-offer received from the opponent is considered an acceptable offer for that opponent (i.e., a positive training example). For a rational agent, it should accept the offer that it proposes. Moreover, if an agent proposes an offer and it is rejected by the opponent, this offer should be treated as a negative training example. In our negotiation system, an agent maintains a separate negotiation history file for each of its opponents. With both positive and negative training examples, it is possible to construct a Bayesian classifier [35] for a negotiation agent to classify future offers (objects) as acceptable or not to the opponent. Nevertheless, we need to deal with the specific challenges of knowledge discovery from a negotiation history file. As a negotiation agent's preference may change over time, the most recent negotiation session archived is more significant than the sessions archived long time ago in terms of inducing the agent's current negotiation preference. Accordingly, the training examples extracted from the past and the present negotiation sessions should be weighted. This weighting procedure corresponds to the feature selection process in machine learning [35] . The weight ( ) S w i of a negotiation session i is computed according to: ( )
where i E is the set of entries (offers and counter-offers) of the i th negotiation [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]. Table 2 shows an example of the weighted sample space which consists of 3 past negotiation sessions and 1 current negotiation session. The scaling factor 1000 η = and 1
S E
ω ω = = are assumed. The entries depicted at the bottom of Table 2 represent the dialogs between an agent and its opponent in the current negotiation session. In fact, the weight assigned to each event in the negotiation history file can be interpreted as the additional sample points attached to that event. In Table 2 , the weight assigned to each session or event is derived according to Eq.(2) and Eq. (3) respectively. According to Table 2 are derived from the events depicted in Table 2 .
However, one common difficulty of applying the Bayesian learning approach to solve real-world problems is how to deal with zero conditional probabilities for the rare features (also called the smoothing problem). We adopt the Laplace smoothing method [35] with a m -estimate to adjust the priori conditional probability is estimated according to Eq.(4).
Probabilistic Negotiation Decision Making
The development of the proposed probabilistic negotiation mechanism for dynamic negotiation environments is driven by the basic intuition that rational negotiators strive for two possibly contradictory objectives [13, 29] undefined. Under such circumstance, a default value of zero will be returned according to our current implementation.
As the time dimension is always an important issue for practical negotiations [34, 48] , our probabilistic negotiation mechanism also takes into account the time pressure. The basic intuition is that when the negotiation deadline is approaching, an agent is more likely to concede in order to make a deal [48] . Therefore, the trade-off factor should automatically be adjusted by: 
By the addition rule of probability theory, Therefore, the probability of acceptance (rejection) of an offer o by the opponent can be estimated according to: 
The Experiments and Results
We adopted an experimental research methodology to evaluate the merits of the proposed knowledge discovery method and the associated probabilistic negotiation decision making mechanism. Our e-Marketplace was instantiated on a server machine 
Experiment One
The first experiment aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the probabilistic negotiation knowledge discovery method under a bi-lateral negotiation situation. The . The utility functions of the buyer agent and the seller agent are depicted in Table 3 . The negotiation deadline was set to 3 125 , rounds. In other words, there was no time pressure for the negotiation agents.
[INSERT 
Experiment Two
In this experiment, we tried to simulate a more realistic negotiation environment, that is, with negotiation time pressure. In typical e-Commerce settings, agents have to find solutions based on limited resources (e.g., time). In this experiment, we set a negotiation deadline of 300 rounds. Since the Pareto optimal negotiation mechanism PO takes a long time to find an agreement in general, it is with no match with our probabilistic negotiation mechanism KD. Therefore, we compared the performance of the KD model with that of the TDT model [36] . As the TDT model was mainly applied to deal with real value domains [8, 12, 36] , we converted the real numbers generated from the TDT formulas to integers (discrete negotiation options) by truncation in this experiment. The parameters 1 β = and 0 1 K = . were employed since they were the typical choices in previous experiments [9, 12, 36] .
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE].
Basically, the negotiation scenario and the parameters for the KD model adopted in experiment one were applied to this experiment. 98. The PO model was deterministic and it could not find a solution before the 1482 th round. As a result, it produced zero joint-utility under the deadline of 300 rounds. The solution found by the KD model is still close to the Pareto Frontier. As showed in this experiment, the probabilistic knowledge discovery method is effective and the KD model outperforms all the other negotiation models when limited resources (e.g., time) is available for bargaining. When the deadline is approaching, the probabilistic negotiation mechanism will lower the value of the trade-off factor α which controls maximizing the agent's self payoff. At the same time, the weight for optimizing offer acceptance is increased. As a result, the KD model is able to find a promising negotiation solution even under great time pressure.
Conclusions and Future Work
With the rapid growth of e-Commerce, many e-Marketplaces have been established to facilitate trading among geographically distributed service consumers and providers.
However, existing negotiation models are weak in supporting multi-issue bargaining in e-Marketplaces because these models often assume that complete information about the negotiation spaces is available. This paper illustrates the design and development of a novel negotiation knowledge discovery method to alleviate the weakness of existing negotiation mechanisms. The proposed knowledge discovery method can help a negotiation agent to discover the preferences of its opponents based on the series of offer exchanges captured in a negotiation history file. Armed with this knowledge, negotiation agents can identify mutually beneficial deals efficiently, and hence leading to the "win-win" business negotiation outcomes. Our experimental results show that the probabilistic negotiation mechanism empowered by the novel knowledge discovery method outperforms the Pareto optimal negotiation model and the TDT negotiation model under realistic negotiation conditions such as the presence of time pressure. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation mechanisms to support modern e-Marketplaces. Future work includes a direct comparison of our method with other utility discovery methods.
Moreover, Bayesian belief network will be explored to represent the dependency among the negotiation issues. A more sophisticated negotiation protocol will also be examined to support optimal multi-party multi-issue negotiations. Finally, an extended study of the human behavioral aspects of the negotiation model will be conducted.
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